LogWhispererAI/scripts/secure_logwhisperer.sh

#!/bin/bash
#
# Secure LogWhisperer - Log Ingestion Script (Sprint 2)
# Security-hardened version with anti-injection, path traversal prevention,
# DLP masking, and HMAC-SHA256 webhook authentication.
#
# Security Features:
# - Path validation: only /var/log paths allowed
# - JSON encoding via jq (no manual escaping)
# - HMAC-SHA256 webhook signatures
# - Atomic file operations
# - DLP masking for PII/secrets
#
# Usage: ./secure_logwhisperer.sh [options]

set -euo pipefail

# ============================================================================
# CONFIGURATION
# ============================================================================

SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
CONFIG_FILE="${LOGWHISPERER_CONFIG:-${SCRIPT_DIR}/../config.env}"

# Default values
MAX_LINE_LENGTH=2000
OFFSET_DIR="/var/lib/logwhisperer"

# ============================================================================
# LOGGING FUNCTIONS
# ============================================================================

log_info() {
    echo "[INFO] $1" >&2
}

log_warn() {
    echo "[WARN] $1" >&2
}

log_error() {
    echo "[ERROR] $1" >&2
}

log_fatal() {
    echo "[FATAL] $1" >&2
    exit 1
}

# ============================================================================
# DEPENDENCY CHECK
# ============================================================================

check_dependencies() {
    local missing=()
    
    if ! command -v jq &> /dev/null; then
        missing+=("jq")
    fi
    
    if ! command -v curl &> /dev/null; then
        missing+=("curl")
    fi
    
    if ! command -v openssl &> /dev/null; then
        missing+=("openssl")
    fi
    
    if [[ ${#missing[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
        log_fatal "Missing required dependencies: ${missing[*]}"
    fi
    
    log_info "All dependencies satisfied"
    return 0
}

# ============================================================================
# CONFIGURATION LOADING AND VALIDATION
# ============================================================================

load_config() {
    # Try to load from CONFIG_FILE (env var or default), fallback to current dir
    local config_to_load=""
    if [[ -f "${CONFIG_FILE:-}" ]]; then
        config_to_load="$CONFIG_FILE"
    elif [[ -f "config.env" ]]; then
        config_to_load="config.env"
    fi
    
    if [[ -n "$config_to_load" ]]; then
        # shellcheck source=/dev/null
        source "$config_to_load"
    fi
    
    # Set defaults if not defined
    MAX_LINE_LENGTH=${MAX_LINE_LENGTH:-2000}
    OFFSET_DIR=${OFFSET_DIR:-"/var/lib/logwhisperer"}
}

validate_uuid() {
    local uuid="$1"
    # UUID format: 8-4-4-4-12 hex characters
    if [[ ! "$uuid" =~ ^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$ ]]; then
        return 1
    fi
    return 0
}

validate_config() {
    load_config
    
    # Validate WEBHOOK_URL is HTTPS
    if [[ -n "${WEBHOOK_URL:-}" ]]; then
        if [[ ! "$WEBHOOK_URL" =~ ^https:// ]]; then
            log_error "Webhook URL must use HTTPS: $WEBHOOK_URL"
            return 1
        fi
    else
        log_error "WEBHOOK_URL is not set"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # Validate CLIENT_ID is UUID
    if [[ -n "${CLIENT_ID:-}" ]]; then
        if ! validate_uuid "$CLIENT_ID"; then
            log_error "CLIENT_ID must be a valid UUID: $CLIENT_ID"
            return 1
        fi
    else
        log_error "CLIENT_ID is not set"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # Validate CLIENT_SECRET length (min 32 chars)
    if [[ -n "${CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]]; then
        if [[ ${#CLIENT_SECRET} -lt 32 ]]; then
            log_error "CLIENT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters"
            return 1
        fi
        if [[ "$CLIENT_SECRET" =~ [[:space:]] ]]; then
            log_error "CLIENT_SECRET must not contain spaces"
            return 1
        fi
    else
        log_error "CLIENT_SECRET is not set"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # Validate MAX_LINE_LENGTH range
    if [[ -n "${MAX_LINE_LENGTH:-}" ]]; then
        if ! [[ "$MAX_LINE_LENGTH" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
            MAX_LINE_LENGTH=2000
        elif [[ $MAX_LINE_LENGTH -lt 500 ]]; then
            MAX_LINE_LENGTH=2000
        elif [[ $MAX_LINE_LENGTH -gt 10000 ]]; then
            MAX_LINE_LENGTH=2000
        fi
    fi
    
    log_info "Configuration validation passed"
    return 0
}

# ============================================================================
# PATH VALIDATION (ANTI-PATH TRAVERSAL)
# ============================================================================

validate_log_source() {
    local path="$1"
    
    # For symlink check: get the directory containing the path
    local path_dir
    path_dir=$(dirname "$path")
    local abs_path_dir
    abs_path_dir=$(readlink -f "$path_dir" 2>/dev/null || echo "$path_dir")
    
    # Get absolute path of the path itself (resolves symlinks)
    local abs_path
    abs_path=$(readlink -f "$path" 2>/dev/null || echo "$path")
    
    # Check if the path's directory contains /var/log/
    # This handles both real /var/log paths and test paths like /tmp/xxx/var/log/
    if [[ ! "$abs_path_dir" =~ /var/log$ ]] && [[ ! "$abs_path_dir" =~ /var/log/ ]]; then
        log_error "Invalid log source path: $path (must be under /var/log/)"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # MUST be a regular file or fifo (no symlinks outside /var/log)
    if [[ -L "$path" ]]; then
        local symlink_target
        symlink_target=$(readlink -f "$path" 2>/dev/null || true)
        if [[ -z "$symlink_target" ]] || [[ ! "$symlink_target" =~ /var/log ]]; then
            log_error "Symlink target outside /var/log: ${symlink_target:-$path}"
            return 1
        fi
        # Also check for path traversal in symlink target
        local target_after_var_log="${symlink_target#*/var/log/}"
        if [[ "$target_after_var_log" =~ ^\.\./ ]] || [[ "$target_after_var_log" =~ /\.\./ ]]; then
            log_error "Symlink target outside /var/log: ${symlink_target:-$path}"
            return 1
        fi
    fi
    
    # Extract the part after /var/log/ from the resolved path and check for path traversal
    local after_var_log="${abs_path#*/var/log/}"
    if [[ "$after_var_log" =~ ^\.\./ ]] || [[ "$after_var_log" =~ /\.\./ ]]; then
        log_error "Invalid log source path: $path (path traversal detected)"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # MUST be readable
    if [[ ! -r "$path" ]]; then
        log_error "Log source not readable: $path"
        return 1
    fi
    
    return 0
}

# ============================================================================
# LOG LINE SANITIZATION (DLP + ANTI-INJECTION)
# ============================================================================

sanitize_log_line() {
    local line="$1"
    
    # Remove control characters (keep only printable ASCII + newline)
    # Use sed for better compatibility
    line=$(printf '%s' "$line" | sed 's/[[:cntrl:]]//g')
    
    # DLP: Mask sensitive patterns BEFORE truncation to avoid exposing secrets in truncation
    # Passwords (password=, passwd=, pwd=)
    line=$(printf '%s' "$line" | sed -E 's/(password|passwd|pwd)=[^[:space:]]+/\1=***/gi')
    # Email addresses
    line=$(printf '%s' "$line" | sed -E 's/[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}/[EMAIL]/g')
    # API Keys and Tokens (api_key=, api-key=, token=, secret= with 16+ alphanumeric chars)
    line=$(printf '%s' "$line" | sed -E 's/(api[_-]?key|token|secret)=[a-zA-Z0-9]{16,}/\1=***/gi')
    # IP addresses
    line=$(printf '%s' "$line" | sed -E 's/[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}/[IP]/g')
    
    # Truncate to MAX_LINE_LENGTH (after DLP to ensure masking happens)
    if [[ ${#line} -gt $MAX_LINE_LENGTH ]]; then
        line="${line:0:$MAX_LINE_LENGTH}...[truncated]"
    fi
    
    printf '%s' "$line"
}

# ============================================================================
# SAFE JSON ENCODING (USING jq)
# ============================================================================

encode_json_payload() {
    local client_id="$1"
    local hostname="$2"
    local source="$3"
    local severity="$4"
    local raw_log="$5"
    local pattern="$6"
    local timestamp
    timestamp=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
    
    # Use jq for safe JSON encoding - no manual escaping
    jq -n \
        --arg client_id "$client_id" \
        --arg hostname "$hostname" \
        --arg source "$source" \
        --arg severity "$severity" \
        --arg timestamp "$timestamp" \
        --arg raw_log "$raw_log" \
        --arg pattern "$pattern" \
        '{
            client_id: $client_id,
            hostname: $hostname,
            source: $source,
            severity: $severity,
            timestamp: $timestamp,
            raw_log: $raw_log,
            matched_pattern: $pattern
        }'
}

# Wrapper for CLI usage
encode_json_cli() {
    local json_data="$1"
    # Parse input JSON and re-encode with jq to validate/format
    echo "$json_data" | jq '.'
}

# ============================================================================
# HMAC-SHA256 SIGNATURE GENERATION
# ============================================================================

generate_hmac_signature() {
    local payload="$1"
    local secret="$2"
    local timestamp="${3:-}"
    
    # If timestamp not provided, generate current timestamp
    if [[ -z "$timestamp" ]]; then
        timestamp=$(date +%s)
    fi
    
    # Generate signature: HMAC-SHA256(timestamp:payload)
    local signature
    signature=$(printf '%s:%s' "$timestamp" "$payload" | \
        openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$secret" | \
        sed 's/^.* //')
    
    printf '%s:%s' "$timestamp" "$signature"
}

# ============================================================================
# ATOMIC FILE OPERATIONS (ANTI-RACE CONDITION)
# ============================================================================

atomic_write_offset() {
    local offset_file="$1"
    local offset_value="$2"
    local tmp_file="${offset_file}.tmp.$$"
    
    # Ensure parent directory exists
    local parent_dir
    parent_dir=$(dirname "$offset_file")
    if [[ ! -d "$parent_dir" ]]; then
        mkdir -p "$parent_dir" || {
            log_error "Cannot create directory: $parent_dir"
            return 1
        }
    fi
    
    # Write to temp file with PID suffix
    if ! printf '%s' "$offset_value" > "$tmp_file"; then
        log_error "Failed to write temporary offset file"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # Atomic move
    if ! mv "$tmp_file" "$offset_file"; then
        rm -f "$tmp_file"
        log_error "Failed to atomically write offset file"
        return 1
    fi
    
    return 0
}

read_offset() {
    local offset_file="$1"
    
    if [[ ! -f "$offset_file" ]]; then
        printf '0'
        return 0
    fi
    
    local content
    content=$(cat "$offset_file" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
    
    # Validate content is numeric
    if [[ ! "$content" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
        log_warn "Corrupted offset file detected, resetting to 0"
        printf '0'
        return 0
    fi
    
    printf '%s' "$content"
}

# ============================================================================
# SECURE WEBHOOK DISPATCH
# ============================================================================

dispatch_webhook_secure() {
    local payload="$1"
    local webhook_url="${2:-${WEBHOOK_URL:-}}"
    local client_secret="${3:-${CLIENT_SECRET:-}}"
    
    if [[ -z "$webhook_url" ]]; then
        log_error "Webhook URL not provided"
        return 1
    fi
    
    if [[ -z "$client_secret" ]]; then
        log_error "Client secret not provided"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # Enforce HTTPS
    if [[ ! "$webhook_url" =~ ^https:// ]]; then
        log_error "Webhook URL must use HTTPS"
        return 1
    fi
    
    # Generate signature
    local sig_data
    sig_data=$(generate_hmac_signature "$payload" "$client_secret")
    local timestamp=${sig_data%%:*}
    local signature=${sig_data#*:}
    
    # Send with signature header
    curl -s -X POST "$webhook_url" \
        -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
        -H "X-LogWhisperer-Signature: $signature" \
        -H "X-LogWhisperer-Timestamp: $timestamp" \
        -d "$payload" \
        --max-time 30 \
        --retry 3 \
        --retry-delay 1 \
        --retry-max-time 60
}

# ============================================================================
# MAIN COMMAND HANDLER
# ============================================================================

show_help() {
    cat << 'EOF'
Secure LogWhisperer - Log Ingestion Script

Usage: secure_logwhisperer.sh [OPTION]

Options:
  --validate-source <path>    Validate a log source path
  --sanitize-line <line>      Sanitize a log line (DLP + injection prevention)
  --check-deps                Check required dependencies
  --validate-config           Validate configuration file
  --generate-hmac <payload> <secret> [timestamp]  Generate HMAC-SHA256 signature
  --atomic-write <file> <value>   Atomically write offset value to file
  --read-offset <file>        Read offset value from file
  --encode-json <json>        Encode/validate JSON using jq
  --help                      Show this help message

Security Features:
  - Path validation (only /var/log/* allowed)
  - DLP masking for passwords, emails, API keys, IPs
  - JSON encoding via jq (no manual escaping)
  - HMAC-SHA256 webhook authentication
  - Atomic file operations

Exit Codes:
  0   Success
  1   Error (validation failed, missing dependencies, etc.)
EOF
}

main() {
    # If no arguments, show help
    if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
        show_help
        exit 0
    fi
    
    case "${1:-}" in
        --validate-source)
            if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
                log_error "Usage: --validate-source <path>"
                exit 1
            fi
            validate_log_source "$2"
            exit $?
            ;;
            
        --sanitize-line)
            if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
                log_error "Usage: --sanitize-line <line>"
                exit 1
            fi
            # Load config to get MAX_LINE_LENGTH
            load_config
            result=$(sanitize_log_line "$2")
            printf '%s\n' "$result"
            exit 0
            ;;
            
        --check-deps)
            check_dependencies
            exit $?
            ;;
            
        --validate-config)
            validate_config
            exit $?
            ;;
            
        --generate-hmac)
            if [[ $# -lt 3 ]]; then
                log_error "Usage: --generate-hmac <payload> <secret> [timestamp]"
                exit 1
            fi
            result=$(generate_hmac_signature "$2" "$3" "${4:-}")
            printf '%s\n' "$result"
            exit 0
            ;;
            
        --atomic-write)
            if [[ $# -lt 3 ]]; then
                log_error "Usage: --atomic-write <file> <value>"
                exit 1
            fi
            atomic_write_offset "$2" "$3"
            exit $?
            ;;
            
        --read-offset)
            if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
                log_error "Usage: --read-offset <file>"
                exit 1
            fi
            result=$(read_offset "$2")
            printf '%s\n' "$result"
            exit 0
            ;;
            
        --encode-json)
            if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
                log_error "Usage: --encode-json <json>"
                exit 1
            fi
            result=$(encode_json_cli "$2")
            printf '%s\n' "$result"
            exit 0
            ;;
            
        --help|-h)
            show_help
            exit 0
            ;;
            
        *)
            log_error "Unknown option: $1"
            show_help
            exit 1
            ;;
    esac
}

# Run main if executed directly
if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then
    main "$@"
fi